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     *The Honorable John R. Padova, Senior District Judge of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 11-1040
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
NARCISO RIVERA MARTINEZ, 
                           Appellant
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-08-cr-00814-001)
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
 on February 7, 2012
Before: SLOVITER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and PADOVA, 
Senior District Judge*
(Filed: February 8, 2012)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
2PADOVA, Senior District Judge.
Appellant Narciso Rivera Martinez pled guilty to two counts of an indictment
charging that he knowingly and intentionally conspired and agreed with others to distribute
one kilogram or more of heroin from November 2007 to December 2008.   He was sentenced
to 120 months’ imprisonment.   He subsequently filed a notice of appeal, and defense counsel
moved to withdraw as appellate counsel, filing a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967).  Although Appellant received an extension of time to file a pro se brief, he
has failed to exercise that right.  For the following reasons, we will grant defense counsel
leave to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a).  We exercise plenary review to determine whether there are any nonfrivolous issues
on appeal.  Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988).  The determination of frivolousness is
informed by the standard of review for each potential claim raised.  See, e.g., United States
v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 2002).
II.
As we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case, we will set forth only select background facts.  An investigation by
the Drug Enforcement Administration revealed Martinez to be a wholesale level customer
of an Ecuadorian heroin importation organization.  Wiretap evidence of multiple intercepted
telephone conversations showed that Martinez took concerted steps to secure shipments of
3heroin, prepare drugs for distribution, and ensured that drug proceeds were remitted back to
the suppliers in Ecuador.  At his guilty plea hearing, Martinez admitted that he conspired to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, contrary to
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A), and in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, but did not
stipulate to an exact amount.  The Government’s proffer revealed information from a
confidential source that Martinez remitted approximately $316,000 in drug proceeds to the
organization, and was engaged in a course of distribution activity that involved well over
three kilograms of heroin.  
Although Martinez participated in two proffer sessions with the Government, both
those meetings were terminated based upon the collective view of the investigating agents
that Martinez was not being truthful.  Accordingly, the Government did not assent to
eligibility for the safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.  In
supplying information to the Probation Office on the offense conduct, the Government
notified Appellant that it would not approve safety valve relief.  Thereafter, defense counsel
notified the Government that he would seek a sentencing hearing on particular Guidelines
issues.  The parties subsequently agreed to a resolution of the sentencing issues, resulting in
the Government agreeing that Martinez should be sentenced at a Total Offense Level of 31,
a Criminal History Category of I, that the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years
should apply, and that it would not seek an aggravating role enhancement under the
Guidelines.  In exchange, Martinez would concede he was not eligible for safety valve relief.
In the Presentence Report, Probation calculated that Appellant had a Base Offense
4Level of 34 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3), because the offense involved at least 3 but
less than 10 kilograms of heroin.  Probation next applied a two-level enhancement pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 because Martinez exercised management responsibility in the drug
organization.  Probation also applied a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
resulting in a Total Offense Level of 33.  Probation calculated Appellant’s Criminal History
Category as I based on zero criminal history points.  As a result, according to Probation,
Appellant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was 135-168 months and noted that
Martinez was subject to a 10 year mandatory minimum term, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).  
The sentencing judge recognized that the Guidelines range was advisory and found
that Martinez was not eligible for the safety valve provision.  Based upon submissions of
counsel, the court granted a downward departure in accordance with the parties’ agreement,
sentencing Martinez as if his Total Offense Level was 31 with a Criminal History Category
of I, ultimately imposing a sentence of 120 months in accordance with the mandatory
minimum.  Martinez was also sentenced to a term of supervised release of 4 years.  Appellant
timely filed this appeal.
III.
Our role in analyzing an Anders brief is twofold.  First, we determine whether the
Anders brief is adequate on its face.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted).  Second, we determine whether an independent review of the record
     1The District Court clearly had jurisdiction over Appellant’s crimes because he was
charged with a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A), which are criminal offenses against the laws of the United States.  See 18
U.S.C. § 3231.  In addition, the record shows that the District Court conducted a thorough
colloquy of Appellant before accepting his plea, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) and
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).  The Court informed Appellant of the nature of the
charges against him, the rights he forfeited by pleading guilty, the maximum penalties
permitted for his offenses, the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the factual
basis for his guilty plea.  See United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2006).
Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s plea, it is therefore plain
that Appellant voluntarily and knowingly pled guilty and any claim to the contrary would be
patently frivolous. 
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reveals any issues that are not frivolous.  Id. (citation omitted).  An adequate Anders brief
“satisf[ies] the court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable
issues,” and “explain[s] why the issues are frivolous.”  Id. (citing United States v. Marvin,
211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)).  “Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim.
However, at a minimum, he or she must meet the ‘conscientious examination’ standard set
forth in Anders.”  Id. (citing Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780). 
We find Counsel’s Anders brief to be adequate on its face.  Where, as here, an
appellant has pled guilty, there are three general issues still open for appeal:  (1) the District
Court’s jurisdiction to enter the conviction and impose sentence; (2) the validity or
voluntariness of Appellant’s guilty plea; and (3) the legality of Appellant’s sentence.  See
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a);  United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).  Although Counsel
addressed only the third of these three issues, we conclude that it was unnecessary to address
the other two issues because they are patently frivolous.1  See Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781. 
Counsel asserts that the only possible issue for review is whether the district court
6erred in not according Martinez the safety valve reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.  We
agree with Counsel that this issue would be frivolous.  Appellant and the Government
reached an agreement whereby he gave up his request for safety valve relief, in return for
which the Government did not seek an aggravating role enhancement.  There is nothing in
the record to indicate that Appellant’s decision to forego safety valve relief was anything
other than knowing and voluntary.  The record also indicates that Appellant was ineligible
for safety valve relief because he had not been truthful in his proffer sessions.  As Appellant
was sentenced in accordance with the statutory mandatory minimum, and the trial judge
committed no error in calculating the advisory Guidelines sentence, we agree that there are
no non-frivolous sentencing issues for appeal.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Counsel has fulfilled his obligation under
Anders and the Local Appellate Rules to provide an adequate no-merit brief, and our
independent review of the record yields no non-frivolous issues for appeal.  We will
therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court, grant Counsel’s motion to withdraw and
deny Appellant’s motion for appointment of new counsel. 
